Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure

Keisuke Nakao, Masatoshi Tsumagari

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

Using a game-theoretic model of criminal procedure, we investigate relative merits and demerits of discretionary and mandatory prosecution. The game illustrates a prosecutor's dilemma associated with his two tasks: evidence production and case screening. Discretionary prosecution makes use of incriminating evidence to dispose of weak cases, but discretionary prosecution may suffer the moral-hazard problem in evidence production more seriously than mandatory prosecution. Our welfare analyses suggest that mandatory prosecution outperforms discretionary prosecution when evidence transmission from the prosecutor to the judge is accurate and/or when the cost of litigation incurred by the prosecutor is large.

本文言語English
論文番号6
ジャーナルAsian Journal of Law and Economics
3
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 法学
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(その他)

フィンガープリント

「Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル