抄録
Because corporate diversification coevolves with organizational structure, a discount for diversification, which is widely documented in the literature, can be caused by organizational structure rather than by the industrial scope of the firm. I examine this possibility based on a large sample of Japanese firms for which the legal (parent–subsidiary) structure of the organization is easily observable. I identify a significant discount for diversified firms with and without control over the organizational structure. I also find that firms with a legally segmented structure (e.g., holding companies) are deeply discounted. My results suggest that diversification and organization are both important determinants of firm value.
本文言語 | English |
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ページ(範囲) | 467-499 |
ページ数 | 33 |
ジャーナル | Financial Management |
巻 | 45 |
号 | 2 |
DOI | |
出版ステータス | Published - 2016 6月 1 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 会計
- 財務
- 経済学、計量経済学