Efficient lottery design

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, Alexander S. Nesterov

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)31-57
ページ数27
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
48
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 1月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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