Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: An interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This article shows that a pre-election alliance between the ruling coalition parties with different ideological motivations may result in bias toward the large size of government. In equilibrium, the reelected coalition government implements a redistributive policy that is greater than the median voter's preference. The results can explain why the Japanese coalition government, which colludes for winning elections, has frequently implemented more diffuse fiscal policies than the previous single-party government.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)235-238
ページ数4
ジャーナルApplied Economics Letters
10
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2003 3 17
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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