Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases

研究成果: Article

抄録

We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner's policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent's probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate's deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens' monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)43-64
ページ数22
ジャーナルEconomics of Governance
10
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2009 1
外部発表Yes

Fingerprint

Elections
Incumbents
Dishonesty
Honesty
Policy implementation
Deviation
Term limits
Monitoring
Politicians

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business and International Management

これを引用

@article{4725b109fafe4f1f95f437b9dc0cc809,
title = "Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases",
abstract = "We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner's policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent's probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate's deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens' monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device.",
keywords = "Electoral competition, Policy bias, Policy-motivated candidates, Re-election pressure",
author = "Kimiko Terai",
year = "2009",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10101-008-0047-6",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "43--64",
journal = "Economics of Governance",
issn = "1435-6104",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases

AU - Terai, Kimiko

PY - 2009/1

Y1 - 2009/1

N2 - We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner's policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent's probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate's deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens' monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device.

AB - We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner's policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent's probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate's deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens' monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device.

KW - Electoral competition

KW - Policy bias

KW - Policy-motivated candidates

KW - Re-election pressure

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=68949143170&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=68949143170&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10101-008-0047-6

DO - 10.1007/s10101-008-0047-6

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:68949143170

VL - 10

SP - 43

EP - 64

JO - Economics of Governance

JF - Economics of Governance

SN - 1435-6104

IS - 1

ER -