Entry deterrence in a unionized oligopoly

Shingo Ishiguro, Yoshimasa Shirai

研究成果: Article査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)210-221
ページ数12
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
49
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1998 1月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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