抄録
This paper focuses on the intertemporal efficiency aspect of economies with environmental resources which have stock externalities. We show why and how such an economy is concerned with intertemporal inefficiency if the property right of the resource is established and traded in a competitive asset market. Moreover, we explore how this inefficiency can be resolved by an income transfer system, and show that the system can also contribute to environmental conservation. Finally, our argument in terms of the efficiency will be applied to a tradeable emission permit system which allows the “banking” of credits. We propose that the government gives credit hoarders a subsidy per credit and allows the credits to grow, provided that they are hoarded.
| 元の言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 21-28 |
| ページ数 | 8 |
| ジャーナル | Environmental Economics and Policy Studies |
| 巻 | 3 |
| 発行部数 | 1 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | Published - 2014 |
| 外部発表 | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Economics and Econometrics
これを引用
Environmental asset market failure, income transfer, and a reform of the tradeable emission permit system. / Onuma, Ayumi.
：: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 巻 3, 番号 1, 2014, p. 21-28.研究成果: Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Environmental asset market failure, income transfer, and a reform of the tradeable emission permit system
AU - Onuma, Ayumi
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper focuses on the intertemporal efficiency aspect of economies with environmental resources which have stock externalities. We show why and how such an economy is concerned with intertemporal inefficiency if the property right of the resource is established and traded in a competitive asset market. Moreover, we explore how this inefficiency can be resolved by an income transfer system, and show that the system can also contribute to environmental conservation. Finally, our argument in terms of the efficiency will be applied to a tradeable emission permit system which allows the “banking” of credits. We propose that the government gives credit hoarders a subsidy per credit and allows the credits to grow, provided that they are hoarded.
AB - This paper focuses on the intertemporal efficiency aspect of economies with environmental resources which have stock externalities. We show why and how such an economy is concerned with intertemporal inefficiency if the property right of the resource is established and traded in a competitive asset market. Moreover, we explore how this inefficiency can be resolved by an income transfer system, and show that the system can also contribute to environmental conservation. Finally, our argument in terms of the efficiency will be applied to a tradeable emission permit system which allows the “banking” of credits. We propose that the government gives credit hoarders a subsidy per credit and allows the credits to grow, provided that they are hoarded.
KW - Asset market failure
KW - Environmental stock externalities
KW - Intertemporal efficiency
KW - Tradeable emission permit system
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84920112562&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84920112562&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF03353965
DO - 10.1007/BF03353965
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84920112562
VL - 3
SP - 21
EP - 28
JO - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
JF - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
SN - 1432-847X
IS - 1
ER -