TY - JOUR

T1 - Evolutional Approach to the Emergence Problem of Order

AU - Oda, Teruya

PY - 1990/1/1

Y1 - 1990/1/1

N2 - 'Problem of Order' is one of the basic problems in sociology. It has two aspects, 'emergence problem of order' and 'stabity problem of order'. No theory has given persuading explanation about how the order emerges. We treat the emergence problem of order as the problem of emergence of cooperation in social dilemma. In repeated 2-person prisoner's dilemma, players can cooperate with 'tit-for-tat' strategy. But in n-person prisoner's dilemma, 'tit-for-tat' cannot achieve cooperation. Axelrod's 'Metanorm game' is a prospective aproach to NPD. In metanorm game, betrayal is punished, and not punishing betrayal is also punished by other members. Axelrod simulated metanorm game 5 times by evolutional technic (high score stategies increase), and every run achieved the cooperation. But in his simutaions, initial strategies and mutation rate are fixed. So we change them and examine the possibility of emergence of order. The results show that initial low vengefulness make it impossible to estabish the order, and that the mutaion rate changes the possibility of order establishment from the situation in which everyone betrays and nobody punishes. We conclude that evolutional simutaion has many probability, treating the emergence problem of order, and social development.

AB - 'Problem of Order' is one of the basic problems in sociology. It has two aspects, 'emergence problem of order' and 'stabity problem of order'. No theory has given persuading explanation about how the order emerges. We treat the emergence problem of order as the problem of emergence of cooperation in social dilemma. In repeated 2-person prisoner's dilemma, players can cooperate with 'tit-for-tat' strategy. But in n-person prisoner's dilemma, 'tit-for-tat' cannot achieve cooperation. Axelrod's 'Metanorm game' is a prospective aproach to NPD. In metanorm game, betrayal is punished, and not punishing betrayal is also punished by other members. Axelrod simulated metanorm game 5 times by evolutional technic (high score stategies increase), and every run achieved the cooperation. But in his simutaions, initial strategies and mutation rate are fixed. So we change them and examine the possibility of emergence of order. The results show that initial low vengefulness make it impossible to estabish the order, and that the mutaion rate changes the possibility of order establishment from the situation in which everyone betrays and nobody punishes. We conclude that evolutional simutaion has many probability, treating the emergence problem of order, and social development.

KW - n-person prisoner's dilemma

KW - problem of order

KW - simulation

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U2 - 10.11218/ojjams.5.81

DO - 10.11218/ojjams.5.81

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84904574315

VL - 5

SP - 81

EP - 99

JO - Sociological Theory and Methods

JF - Sociological Theory and Methods

SN - 0913-1442

IS - 1

ER -