Fair and Truthful Mechanism with Limited Subsidy

Hiromichi Goko, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Hanna Sumita, Akihisa Tamura, Yu Yokoi, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Conference contribution

抄録

The notion of envy-freeness is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by introducing an additional divisible resource, i.e., money, to subsidize envious agents. In this paper, we aim to design a truthful allocation mechanism of indivisible goods to achieve both fairness and efficiency criteria with a limited amount of subsidy. Following the work of Halpern and Shah, our central question is as follows: to what extent do we need to rely on the power of money to accomplish these objectives? We show that, when agents have matroidal valuations, there is a truthful allocation mechanism that achieves envy-freeness and utilitarian optimality by subsidizing each agent with at most 1, the maximum marginal contribution of each item for each agent. The design of the mechanism rests crucially on the underlying matroidal M-convexity of the Lorenz dominating allocations. For superadditive valuations, we show that there is a truthful mechanism that achieves envy-freeness and utilitarian optimality, with each agent receiving a subsidy of at most m; furthermore, we show that the amount m is necessary even when agents have additive valuations.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ534-542
ページ数9
ISBN(電子版)9781713854333
出版ステータスPublished - 2022
イベント21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022 - Auckland, Virtual, New Zealand
継続期間: 2022 5月 92022 5月 13

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
1
ISSN(印刷版)1548-8403
ISSN(電子版)1558-2914

Conference

Conference21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022
国/地域New Zealand
CityAuckland, Virtual
Period22/5/922/5/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

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