Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations

研究成果: Article査読

13 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper introduces a general framework for the fair allocation of indivisible objects when each agent can consume at most one (e.g., houses, jobs, queuing positions) and monetary compensations are possible. This framework enables us to deal with identical objects and monotonicity of preferences in ranking objects. We show that the no-envy solution is the only solution satisfying equal treatment of equals, Maskin monotonicity, and a mild continuity property. The same axiomatization holds if the continuity property is replaced by a neutrality property.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)549-563
ページ数15
ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
43
5
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 6月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 応用数学

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