TY - JOUR
T1 - Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements
AU - Terai, Kimiko
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Amihai Glazer, Makoto Hanazono, Yukihiro Nishimura, and the seminar participants at the University of California, Irvine, Meiji University, Yokohama National University, Hosei University, Waseda University, and Nagoya University for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support by Nomura Foundation for Academic Promotion, Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance, and Hosei University is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2012/10
Y1 - 2012/10
N2 - We examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician's motive for re-election and a financial mechanism for compliance. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement, and is aware that his ex post deviation will be deterred by the financial mechanism, he too decides to participate in the agreement, which then corrects externality problems.
AB - We examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician's motive for re-election and a financial mechanism for compliance. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement, and is aware that his ex post deviation will be deterred by the financial mechanism, he too decides to participate in the agreement, which then corrects externality problems.
KW - Enforceability
KW - Financial mechanism
KW - International environmental agreements
KW - Re-election concerns
KW - Time-consistency
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U2 - 10.1007/s10640-012-9563-5
DO - 10.1007/s10640-012-9563-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84866284161
SN - 0924-6460
VL - 53
SP - 297
EP - 308
JO - Environmental and Resource Economics
JF - Environmental and Resource Economics
IS - 2
ER -