Fiscal forward guidance: A case for selective transparency

Ippei Fujiwara, Yuichiro Waki

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

Should the fiscal authority use forward guidance to reduce future policy uncertainty perceived by private agents? Using dynamic general equilibrium models, we examine the welfare effects of announcing future fiscal policy shocks and show that selective transparency is desirable — announcing distortionary future policy shocks can be detrimental to ex ante social welfare, whereas announcing non-distortionary shocks generally improves welfare. Sizable welfare gains are found with constructive ambiguity regarding the timing of a tax increase in a realistic fiscal consolidation scenario. However, being secretive about distortionary shocks is time inconsistent, and welfare loss from communication may be unavoidable.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)236-248
ページ数13
ジャーナルJournal of Monetary Economics
116
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

フィンガープリント 「Fiscal forward guidance: A case for selective transparency」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル