Fiscal restraints by advisors

Shun ichiro Bessho, Kimiko Terai

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This study investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining government fiscal discipline when the advisor's appointment is determined endogenously. Our theoretical model shows that an incumbent politician has an incentive to employ an external advisor as a commitment device for fiscal discipline before being aware of his own competence level. The advisor acts as a restraint on public expenditure, which works to control the incumbent politician's ex post overspending to buy votes. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis in the Japanese case where governments with directors from the central government tend to spend less.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)205-232
ページ数28
ジャーナルEconomics of Governance
14
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 8

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)

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