Government deficits, political inefficiency, and fiscal reconstruction in Japan

Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, Hiroki Kondo

研究成果: Article

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate the behavior of government deficits and fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan both theoretically and empirically. We first develop a dynamic framework of fiscal reconstruction process using the dynamic game theory among various interest groups. The distribution of a tax increase, that is, contribution of taxes to reducing public debt and raising privileges, depends on the political efficiency of lobbying activities. We also investigate empirically the relationship between the political inefficiency and the outcome of fiscal reconstruction process in the Japanese (national) general account.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)169-183
ページ数15
ジャーナルAnnals of Economics and Finance
3
1
出版ステータスPublished - 2002 5

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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