Health insurance reform and economic growth: Simulation analysis in Japan

Toshihiro Ihori, Ryuta Ray Kato, Masumi Kawade, Shun ichiro Bessho

研究成果: Article査読

19 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper evaluates the drastic reforms of Japanese public health insurance initiated in 2006. We employ a computable general equilibrium framework to numerically examine the reforms for an aging Japan in the dynamic context of overlapping generations. Our simulation produced the following results: first, an increase in the co-payment rate, a prominent feature of the 2006 reform, would promote economic growth and welfare by encouraging private saving. Second, the ex-post moral hazard behavior following the increase in co-payment rates, however, reduces economic growth. Third, Japan's trend of increasing the future public health insurance benefits can mainly be explained by its aging population, and increasing the co-payment rate does little to reduce future payments of public health insurance benefits. Fourth, the effect on future economic burdens of reducing medical costs through efficiencies in public health insurance, emphasis on preventive medical care, or technological progress in the medical field is small. Finally, a policy of maintaining public health insurance at a fixed percentage of GDP will require reducing public health insurance benefits, perhaps up to 45% by 2050. Such a policy also reduces economic growth until approximately 2035. Our simulation indicates that the reform does not significantly reduce future public health insurance benefits, but it can enhance economic growth and welfare by encouraging private saving.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)227-239
ページ数13
ジャーナルJapan and The World Economy
23
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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