How an ineffective agent can increase his budget

Kimiko Terai, Amihai Glazer

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

A principal aware that an agent exerts little effort will nevertheless fund the agent, because the principal values the output the agent produces. The agent in turn decides how hard to work by anticipating how his behavior affects the budget the principal will give him. Under some conditions, the principal gives the agent large budgets anticipating that the agent will not work hard. The corrupt environment aggravates the problem. An agent who can set the budget ameliorates the problem, though incompletely.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)133-147
ページ数15
ジャーナルEconomics and Politics
33
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 3

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

引用スタイル