How does collective intelligence emerge in the standard minority game?

Satoshi Kurihara, Kensuke Fukuda, Toshio Hirotsu, Osamu Akashi, Shinya Sato, Toshiharu Sugawara

研究成果: Conference contribution

抄録

In this paper we analyze a simple adaptive model of competition called the Minority Game, which is used in analyzing competitive phenomena such as the operation of the market economy. The Minority Game is played by many simple autonomous agents, which develop collective self-organization as a result of simple behavioral rules. Many algorithms that produce the desired behavior in the game have been proposed. In all work to date, however, the focus has been on the macroscopic behavior of the agents as a whole. We focus on the behavior of individual agents, paying particular attention to the original form of the Minority Game. We suggest that the core elements responsible for the development of self-organization are (i) rules that place a good constraint on the behaviors of individual agents and (ii) the existence of rules that lead to effective indirect coordination. We also show that when efficient organization is formed, a power-law can be seen among behavior of individual agents.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルThe Complex Networks of Economic Interactions
ホスト出版物のサブタイトルEssays in Agent-Based Economics and Econophysics
編集者Akira Namatame, Taisie Kaizouji, Yuuji Aruka
ページ279-289
ページ数11
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2006 12 1
外部発表はい

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
567
ISSN(印刷版)0075-8442

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 数学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(その他)

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