Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions

Hideyuki Tomiyama, Taisuke Otsu

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

By extending de Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2016), we derive testable restrictions for uniqueness of equilibrium in games with multi-dimensional actions. We discuss two models of payoff functions which imply certain covariance restrictions for players’ actions. These restrictions can be used to construct an identified set of strategic parameters under multiple equilibria.

本文言語English
論文番号110440
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
215
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2022 6月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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