Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

研究成果: Article査読

40 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm's preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)14-20
ページ数7
ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
48
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012 1月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 応用数学

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