Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule

Yuta Nakamura

研究成果: Article

抜粋

This study is related to a Condorcetian problem of information aggregation that finds a "true" social ordering using individual orderings, that are supposed to partly contain the "truth". In this problem, we introduce a new maximum likelihood rule and analyse its performance. This rule selects an alternative that maximizes the probability of realizing individual orderings, conditional on the alternative being the top according to a true social ordering. We show that under a neutrality condition of alternatives, the probability that our rule selects the true top alternative is higher than that of any other rule.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)271-284
ページ数14
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
66
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2015 6 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

フィンガープリント Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule' の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらはともに一意のフィンガープリントを構成します。

  • これを引用