Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment

Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how varying or eliminating feedback about payoffs affects: (1) subjects’ learning about the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs in weighted voting games; (2) the transfer of acquired learning from one committee choice problem to a similar but different problem. In the experiment, subjects choose to join one of two committees (weighted voting games) and obtain a payoff stochastically determined by a voting theory. We found that: (i) subjects learned to choose the committee that generates a higher expected payoff even without feedback about the payoffs they received; (ii) there was statistically significant evidence of “meaningful learning” (transfer of learning) only for the treatment with no payoff-related feedback. This finding calls for re-thinking existing models of learning to incorporate some type of introspection.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)131-153
ページ数23
ジャーナルTheory and Decision
83
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 6月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 決定科学(全般)
  • 発達心理学および教育心理学
  • 人文科学(その他)
  • 応用心理学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用

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