Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

Miyu Yoshihara, Toru Namerikawa, Zhihua Qu

研究成果: Conference contribution

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ1658-1663
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9784907764609
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 10月 15
イベント57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018 - Nara, Japan
継続期間: 2018 9月 112018 9月 14

出版物シリーズ

名前2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018

Other

Other57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
国/地域Japan
CityNara
Period18/9/1118/9/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 制御およびシステム工学
  • 制御と最適化
  • 器械工学

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