Note on stable mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability

Takayuki Watanabe, Nobuo Matsubayashi

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies the stability of mergers between firms in a Cournot market. Unlike most existing works, we consider a demand structure where the substitutability between firms is asymmetric. We specifically focus on the stability of the grand coalition by analyzing the core allocation, The main result of our analysis shows that the grand coalition becomes stable, as the market is more asymmetric in terms of substitutability.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)2024-2033
ページ数10
ジャーナルEconomics Bulletin
33
3
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 11月 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)

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