On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies the problem of assigning n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)56-62
ページ数7
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
90
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 11月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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