On the neutrality of coalition formation in a pure bargaining problem

Haruo Imai, Naoki Watanabe

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider the sequential bargaining game à la Stahl-Binmore-Rubinstein with random proposers, juxtaposing an ex ante coalition formation stage to their bargaining game. On the basis of the expected outcomes in the negotiation over how to split a dollar, players can form coalitions in a sequential manner, within each of which they can redistribute their payoffs. It turns out that the grand coalition does form, and that each player receives his discounted expected payoff, which is obtained by playing as a single player in the negotiation, although there could be many equilibria in the bargaining stage.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)352-362
ページ数11
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
56
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2005 9 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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