Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition

Shungo Omiya, Yasunari Tamada, Tsung Sheng Tsai

研究成果: Article査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A team composed of a principal and an agent needs to choose a project to run, while they may have different preferences regarding the project. The agent has various types of bias in terms of project selection, and he can make an effort in acquiring the information regarding the promise of projects. The principal can either keep the decision-making authority of choosing which project to run, or delegate it to the agent. We find that the optimal effort level under the principal's authority is at its highest when the agent is the most biased, while under the agent's authority it is also at its highest when the agent has an intermediate bias. Therefore, the principal should keep the authority and communicate with the agent when the agent is relatively biased, and delegate the authority when the agent has an intermediate bias. However, from the team's point of view where both players’ payoffs are taken into account, the principal may delegate too much authority to a relatively unbiased agent, and too little authority to a relatively biased agent.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)54-71
ページ数18
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
137
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 5 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 組織的行動および人的資源管理

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