Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior

研究成果: Article

2 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

The equilibrium redistributive policy proposals of two parties with policy preferences are studied. Each party's ideal policy coincides with that of citizens having a particular income level, and the party's utility function reflects its attitude to the trade-off between the choice of preferred policy and the likelihood of victory. When parties face uncertainty about citizens' abstention from voting, divergent equilibrium proposals are derived which are more moderate than their contrasting ideal policies. Political equilibria under different prior beliefs on abstention are then compared. It is shown that a lower likelihood of abstention in a particular income group induces both parties to make proposals catering to that group, in equilibrium.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)155-172
ページ数18
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
27
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2006 8
外部発表Yes

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voter
uncertainty
citizen
income
voting
Group
Vote
Uncertainty
Abstention

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

これを引用

Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior. / Terai, Kimiko.

:: Social Choice and Welfare, 巻 27, 番号 1, 08.2006, p. 155-172.

研究成果: Article

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