Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations

Toru Hokari, Anita Van Gellekom

研究成果: Article査読

13 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

On the domain of convex games, many desirable properties of solutions are compatible and there are many single-valued solutions that are intuitively appealing. We establish some interesting logical relations among properties of single-valued solutions. In particular, we introduce a new property, weak contribution-monotonicity, and show that this property is a key property that links other properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and dummy-player-out.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)593-607
ページ数15
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
31
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2003 10月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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