Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Louisa Putterman, Jean Robert Tyran, Kenjua Kamei

研究成果: Article査読

88 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1213-1222
ページ数10
ジャーナルJournal of Public Economics
95
9-10
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 10月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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