Ranking and long-term unemployment in a model with efficiency wages

Akiomi Kitagawa, Souichi Ohta, Hiroshi Teruyama

研究成果: Chapter

抄録

This chapter considers the long-run consequences of ranking job applicants on the basis of their unemployment durations by using a general equilibrium model, in which the wages paid by firms not only motivate their employees but also induce jobless workers to preserve their employability. Ranking and long-term unemployment become actual when the cost of establishing a new firm is so large that firms cannot pay high wages to their employees. By subsidizing newly established firms, the government can guide the economy to a more efficient equilibrium, in which every job seeker can find a new job by experiencing one period of unemployment, and thus firms’ distaste for the long-term unemployed is effectively nullified.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルAdvances in Japanese Business and Economics
出版社Springer
ページ65-115
ページ数51
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 1 1

出版物シリーズ

名前Advances in Japanese Business and Economics
12
ISSN(印刷版)2197-8859
ISSN(電子版)2197-8867

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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