Redistribution under proportional representation

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between proportional representation voting system and the size of government via its effects on political equilibrium. The multiparty spatial competition on tax-transfer policy and the post-electoral coalition formation are examined. The implemented policy does not necessarily reflect the median voter's preference, ranging from laissez-faire to a redistributive economy according to income distribution. It can even reflect the preference of the lower income class in spite of equal income distribution, leading to the large-scale redistribution. Our results can explain the heterogeneous sizes of government observed among European proportional representation democracies.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)371-389
ページ数19
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
22
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2004 4 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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