Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem

Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)211-223
ページ数13
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
130
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 11月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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