Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

研究成果: Article査読

24 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees' total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor's revenue is uniquely determined.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)505-523
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
37
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2008 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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