Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

研究成果: Article

19 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees' total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor's revenue is uniquely determined.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)505-523
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
37
発行部数4
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2008 12
外部発表Yes

Fingerprint

profit sharing
Patents
Bargaining
Coalitions
patent
Profit
coalition
Sharing
Grand Coalition
Game
Maximise
revenue
firm
Patent licensing
Profit sharing
Coalition structure
Necessary Conditions
Sufficient Conditions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

これを引用

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