抄録
This paper examines the equilibrium incentive for firms to use behavior-based price discrimination in a duopoly market with exogenous switching costs. We find that if there is a large difference in the existing market shares between two firms, then discriminatory pricing is a unique Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, there are three Nash equilibria: both firms engage in discriminatory pricing, or engage in uniform pricing, or engage in mixed strategies. The respective firms are worse off in the discriminatory equilibrium compared with the others.
本文言語 | English |
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ジャーナル | Economics Bulletin |
巻 | 12 |
号 | 1 |
出版ステータス | Published - 2007 1月 15 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)