Strategic delegation when public inputs for a global good are imperfect substitutes

Yukihiro Nishimura, Kimiko Terai

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This paper explores the outcome of non-cooperative decision making by elected politicians under transnational externalities. In each country, the delegate (the government) is elected by means of majority voting. Thereafter, delegates of each country choose their environmental policy, which becomes a public input to the global common good. In equilibrium, the median voter deliberately elects a delegate whose preferences differ from his/her own, to pursue advantages in international decision making. In this paper we use the social composition function to capture various cases of environmental problems with complementarity (imperfect substitutability). Our analysis shows the following results: with sufficient complementarity of the public inputs, strategic delegation can lead to the delegation of decisions to a “greener” politician. However, with almost perfect substitutability of public inputs, the only equilibria may involve asymmetric provision of public inputs to the global common good, even if the countries are identical.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)96-111
ページ数16
ジャーナルInternational Tax and Public Finance
24
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 2 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 会計
  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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