Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)53-68
ページ数16
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
53
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 1月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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