Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts

Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, Jun Zhang

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We examine the roles of (slightly weakened versions of) the observable substitutability condition and the observable substitutability across doctors condition of Hatfield et al. (2021) in many-to-many matching with contracts. We modify the standard cumulative offer algorithm to find stable outcomes and prove new results on the existence of stable outcomes. It is remarkable that size monotonicity at the offer-proposing side is essential for the existence result under observable substitutability across doctors.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)503-512
ページ数10
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
129
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 9月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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