Competencia fiscal con las firmas heterogÍneas

Richard E. Baldwin, Toshihiro Okubo

研究成果: Article査読

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies tax competition in an economic geography model that allows for agglomeration economies with trade costs and heterogeneous firms. We find that the Nash equilibrium involves a large country charging a higher tax than a small nation. Lower trade costs lead to an intensification of competition, a drop in Nash tax rates and a narrowing of the gap. Since large, productive firms are naturally more sensitive to tax differences in our model, large firms are the crux of tax competition in our model. This also means that tax competition has consequences for the average productivity of big and small nations’ industries; by lowering tax rates, a small nation can attract high-productivity firms.

寄稿の翻訳タイトルTax competition with heterogeneous firms
本文言語Spanish
ページ(範囲)309-326
ページ数18
ジャーナルSpatial Economic Analysis
9
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 7 14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 地理、計画および開発
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 地球惑星科学(その他)

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