Tax policy under the "generational election system"

研究成果: Chapter

抄録

This chapter investigates the effects of introducing the “generational election system” proposed by Ihori and Doi (Nihon-seiji no keizai-bunseki (Economic analysis of Japanese politics), Bokutaku-Sha, Tokyo, 1998). The generational election system (or the election district by generation) consists of election districts divided by not only region but also generation. In industrial countries, intergenerational conflicts of interest are large at present. In particular, the older generation has more political power because of aging and fewer children. In an electoral system that consists of election districts divided only by region, conflicts of interest among regions can be dealt with in the Congress, but intergenerational conflicts are buried in each district because the opinions of older people dominate those of younger people. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the effects of introducing the generational election system using an overlapping generations model. The results of the voting equilibrium show that the preferred policy of the younger generation can be better represented in the generational election system compared with the current majoritarian system. Furthermore, the selected policy does not depend on the turnout rate of the younger generation. These results suggest that introducing the generational election system benefits both the younger and future generations.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルAdvances in Japanese Business and Economics
出版社Springer
ページ145-165
ページ数21
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2015

出版物シリーズ

名前Advances in Japanese Business and Economics
8
ISSN(印刷版)2197-8859
ISSN(電子版)2197-8867

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

フィンガープリント 「Tax policy under the "generational election system"」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル