The organization of supplier networks: Effects of delegation and intermediation

Dilip Mookherjee, Masatoshi Tsumagari

研究成果: Article査読

62 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1179-1219
ページ数41
ジャーナルEconometrica
72
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2004 7月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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