The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

研究成果: Article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)325-348
ページ数24
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
38
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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