The power of joint decision-making in a finitely-repeated dilemma

研究成果: Review article査読

6 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, and then compare the pairs' behaviour with the behaviour of individuals in the same game played against individuals. We vary treatments by the matching protocol between decision-making units (partner or stranger matching). Our data show that when the matching is fixed for all periods, pairs are able to sustain cooperation at high levels while individuals steadily decrease contributions from period to period. By sharp contrast, when pairs are randomly matched with other pairs in every period, they quickly decrease contributions over the periods, as is the case for individuals with the stranger matching protocol.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)600-622
ページ数23
ジャーナルOxford Economic Papers
71
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 7月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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