The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)193-197
ページ数5
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
171
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 10月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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