TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms
AU - Kamei, Kenju
N1 - Funding Information:
I thank John Hey for his hospitality when I conducted the experiment in the University of York. I also thank Mark Wilson (an IT manager at the University of York) for his support in setting the computers in the experimental sessions. I also thank the editor, Joseph E. Harrington, and anonymous referee for valuable comments. This project was funded by Durham University Business School, United Kingdom , and the Kyoto University Institute of Economic Research (KIER) foundation, Japan .
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2018/10
Y1 - 2018/10
N2 - This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.
AB - This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Dilemma
KW - Experiment
KW - Social norms
KW - Third party punishment
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U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051138515
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 171
SP - 193
EP - 197
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
ER -