The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: The Asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results

Yair Tauman, Naoki Watanabe

研究成果: Article査読

29 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)135-149
ページ数15
ジャーナルEconomic Theory
30
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 1 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

フィンガープリント

「The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: The Asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル