The strategic effect of retailers' in-store advertising services under product variety competition

Haruki Kobayashi, Nobuo Matsubayashi

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study a retailer service model of in-store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in-store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between-firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)232-242
ページ数11
ジャーナルManagerial and Decision Economics
40
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 4

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 戦略と経営
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ
  • 技術マネージメントおよび技術革新管理

フィンガープリント

「The strategic effect of retailers' in-store advertising services under product variety competition」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル