Computers are now present almost everywhere and connected into ever more complex networks. This means not only that embedded systems are more complicated, but also that communication among the diverse stakeholders of systems is much harder than before. This paper introduces the D-Case approach to a systematic explanation of embedded-systems dependability. A D-Case is a structured document that argues for the dependability of a system, supported by evidence. This extends the notion of safety cases  commonly used in (European) safety-critical sectors. The goal is to develop the D-Case language for communication systems dependability among the stakeholders. The paper reports the experience in constructing a D-Case for the remote test surveillance system developed to demonstrate certain dependability system components. D-Case construction is shown to be an effective method in explaining how each system component contributes to the overall dependability of the system. Another experiment shows how the D-Case approach can promote dependability through the life cycle of a larger system. Finally, the paper presents some comments on the difficulties and insights for future work.