Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver

研究成果: Article査読

33 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism that satisfies non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness, and the only mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where "sd" stands for first-order stochastic dominance).

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)253-277
ページ数25
ジャーナルTheoretical Economics
9
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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