Two-sided matching with externalities: A survey

Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki, Shigeo Muto

研究成果: Review article査読

12 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The literature on two-sided matching markets with externalities has grown over the past several years, as it is now one of the primary topics of research in two-sided matching theory. A matching market with externalities is different from the classical matching market in that agents not only care about who they are matched with, but also care about whom other agents are matched to. In this survey, we start with two-sided matching markets with externalities for the one-to-one case and then focus on the many-to-one case. For many-to-one matching problems, these externalities often are present in two ways. First, the agents on the "many" side may care about who their colleagues are, that is, who else is matched to the same "one." Second, the "one" side may care about how the others are matched.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)35-71
ページ数37
ジャーナルJournal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
59
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2016 3月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 決定科学(全般)
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ

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