U.S. tax policy and health insurance demand: Can a regressive policy improve welfare?

Karsten Jeske, Sagiri Kitao

研究成果: Article査読

43 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The U.S. tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it subsidizes only those offered group insurance through their employers, who also tend to have a relatively high income. Moreover, the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system giving high income earners a larger subsidy. To understand the effect of the policy, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance. A complete removal of the subsidy may lead to a partial collapse of the group insurance market, reduce the insurance coverage and deteriorate welfare. There is, however, room for improving the coverage and welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)210-221
ページ数12
ジャーナルJournal of Monetary Economics
56
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 3月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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